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12 May 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Staff Meeting Minutes of 12 May 1981

The Director chaired the meeting. []

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[] reported he had received DoD's comments on Executive Order 12036, but had not yet received the submissions from State or Justice. [] said he will review the DoD comments and will talk to Admiral Inman to see about scheduling a SIG(I) meeting for 20 May. []

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The Director said State Department has backed off in its opposition to the Agency's FOIA initiatives. However, the Director said he is not optimistic about Justice changing its views. []

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The Director noted that Secretary Haig will make a speech on terrorism. []

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Hitz noted consultations with the Hill continue on Executive Order 12036 and said he will be talking to Jack Blake, of the SSCI Staff, this afternoon about the Executive Order. Hitz said that Senator Harrison Schmitt (R., NM) may want to hold hearings on the Order but he (Hitz) hopes to forestall this with the discussions with Blake this afternoon. If Schmitt opts to hold hearings, it will impact on the Director's deadline for the final Order. []

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McMahon reported that the Soviet ships, which had been anchored off the coast of Libya, have begun moving eastward in the Mediterranean and may be doing so to monitor a Sixth Fleet exercise. []

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McMahon reported that his people were checking on a 10 May Jack Anderson column, which appeared in the Washington Post, which quoted directly from a February 1981 NFAC paper on Chinese policy in Africa (attached). []

25X1

McMahon noted that Richard Allen reviewed a NFAC-produced videotape TV show on King Hussein and was pleased with it. Allen has asked that we edit the program so that he can show it to the President. Allen will forward to the Agency a letter requesting more TV programs on various subjects. In response to the Director's question about how much effort is expended in the preparation of these shows, Kerr said that not much time is taken up in their production since a lot of it is based upon newsreel shots and on-the-shelf items. []

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[REDACTED]

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Hetu noted that preparations for the 13 May security program [REDACTED] are completed and that 22 officials from throughout the Government will attend. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

In response to the Director's question about what we should concern ourselves with in the Senate Budget Authorization Report, Hitz said that the report was not as bad as we were led to believe and that he was optimistic that we could get back [REDACTED] for external analysis which was cut in the report. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] noted that there will be divided opinions at the NFIB on 14 May when the SNIE on terrorism is considered. [REDACTED] said that both DIA and State will dissent on the report. In response to the Director's question, McMahon discussed State's position more fully. In response to the Director's question about whether DIA had articulated its position on the SNIE, [REDACTED] said yes and it was reflected in the draft SNIE, although he was not sure whether DIA would adhere to their position at the NFIB.

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The Director asked for an assessment of what the new government in France will mean to Africa and asked for material for a White Paper on the situation in Central America. McMahon said State Department has most of the input for the White Paper, but NFAC will provide whatever assistance is required. [REDACTED]

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[] Hugel introduced Clair George as the A/DDO for Clandestine Operations.

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Hugel reported that the Polish government has imposed travel restrictions and is reducing its diplomatic presence overseas by 50 percent in an effort to economize. []

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Attachment

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B7THE WASHINGTON POST
10 May 1981

Jack Anderson

What China Is Up to in Africa

China is now on the United States' side in the worldwide struggle against the Soviet Union—largely on the basis of the old proverb that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Faced with this reality, the National Security Council has been curious about what the Chinese have been up to in Africa that may affect American interests there.

The best answer so far has been in a secret report by the Central Intelligence Agency a few weeks ago. The document, reviewed by my associate Dale Van Atta, represents the current information on which the Reagan administration is basing its policy in Africa.

“Over the past quarter of a century,” the CIA report notes, “[Peking] has attempted to project its influence in Africa with varying degrees of intensity and for a variety of purposes.

“Relative to Chinese interests in other parts of the world, [Peking's] interest in Africa is small, and both African and Chinese leaders are aware that China's influence in the continent is marginal.” The report adds, however, that there is no reason to suggest that Chinese interest in Africa will not increase.

“Today, the principal objective of Chinese policy in Africa is to check the spread of Soviet influence,” the CIA report continues. “The major focus of [Peking's] effort has been in southern Africa, where Moscow has been especially active for the past five years.”

The intelligence analysts point out that China

has followed random policies in Africa over the past few decades, but that in the last three years a revitalized, better coordinated policy appears to have emerged. As the CIA experts see the situation, Chinese policy has now focused “on its prime objective and [takes] into account the limited resources it has to spend on an arena far from its own borders.”

The key elements in the current Chinese policy toward Africa, as the CIA understands them, are:

- “Exhort southern African states to be wary of Moscow.”

- “Advise the West—especially the United States—to provide military and economic assistance to states in the region, and to press South Africa to abandon its claim to Namibia and its domestic policy of apartheid.”

- “Urge liberation movements in the region to unite to oppose both colonialism and Soviet hegemony.”

- “Aid liberation movements with small arms and training if they show promise of being effective and not committed to Moscow.”

How Peking expects to accomplish this ambitious program without a far greater commitment of money and effort, the CIA report does not say.

As for the future course of Chinese activity in the continent, this is what the CIA analysts have predicted:

“[In] the coming decade, China is likely to seek to enhance the stability of states that it believes

are not under Moscow's thumb and have a chance to remain in power.” This encouragement presumably would include economic assistance, if not outright military support.

“With regard to regimes friendly to Moscow, or perceived to be inherently unstable, China is likely to press for evolutionary change or, if compelled by competition with Moscow, revolutionary change sponsored by anti-Soviet resistance movements,” the CIA report predicts.

In short, intelligence experts see the possibility that China would invest significant amounts of economic and military aid to encourage “destabilization” of Soviet-dominated regimes—though Peking would prefer not to be forced into such a situation.

As for the specific regimes that might become embroiled in the power struggle, the CIA reports that, so far at least, Tanzania and Zambia, which have longstanding ties to China, “remain friendly,” though both countries maintain relations with the Soviet Union.

At the other end of the scale, according to the CIA, is Mozambique, which maintains formal relations with Peking but, like Angola, remains “close to Moscow.”

“China's greatest success has been with Zimbabwe,” the CIA report states. There, “the ruling party, once a Chinese client, remains loyal to [Peking], cool to Moscow and committed to economic and political involvement with the West.”

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